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RECENT EXTENSIONS IN THE USE OF COMMERCIAL
LETTERS OF CREDIT
THE commercial letter of credit-long familiar in banking circles as a means
of providing for the payment of goods-has adopted a new look.' Influenced
by the simplicity, inexpensiveness and feasibility of the letter of credit mechan-
ism,'2 contracting parties now utilize the instrument as security against a
failure of performance, a demand traditionally fulfilled by placing funds in
escrow or posting a bond. In contrast to the orthodox use of the instrument,
where the parties anticipate that the letter of credit will be the means of paying
for a sale, the beneficiary of the "new" letter of credit will collect from the
bank only in the event of a contingency which the parties do not expect will
occur. While such an arrangement is the most practical method of handling
many transactions, it also raises significant mechanical and legal problems,
both for the banks and for the contracting parties.
1. Information on the new use of letters of credit was obtained in the course of several
interviews with commercial bankers in New York and San Francisco (hereinafter cited
as INravmvs) who have helped to develop the technique. One banker estimated that of
the commercial credits of all descriptions issued by his bank in 1956, some 10% were of
this nature. The fact situations to be considered in text are samples of actual transactions
made by banks engaged in international trade. The Yale Law Journal acknowledges with
gratitude the cooperation of these several banks in making available such information.
2. Evidence of the pliability inherent in the instrument is the fact that legal writers
have been able to describe its operation in terms of half a dozen different concepts.
DEMOauE LE CRtDIT DOCUMENTAIRE EN DROIT ANGLAIS 147-52 (1934) ; Hershey, Letters
of Credit, 32 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3 (1918). See Llewellyn, Introduction, in FINKELSTEIN,
LEGAL AspEcTs OF COMM ERCIa. LETTERS OF CREDIT xxvii-xxviii (1930) (hereinafter cited
as FINEELsTmIN). See also GUTrERIDGE & MEGRAH, THE LAW OF BANKERS' COMMERCIAL
CREDITS 14-26 (1955) (hereinafter cited as GUTTERIDGE & MEGRAH) ; Trimble, The Law
Merchant and the Letter of Credit, 61 HARv. L. REv. 981 (1948); Thayer, Irrevocable
Credits in International Commerce: Their Legal Nature, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 1031 (1936).
Less concerned with the legal theories by which the parties may or may not be liable,
the banking community has recognized a wide variety of forms of letters of credit, each
of which creates different legal obligations, e.g., revocable and irrevocable credits, con-
firmed and unconfirmed, negotiation and straight. ROSENTHAL, TECHNIQUES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 340-48 (1950) ; WARD & H.ARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 27-32
(3d ed. 1948) (hereinafter cited as WARD & HR.uIE). See also DAvis, THE LAW RE-
LATING TO COMMERCIAL LETTERs OF CREDIT 23-41 (2d ed. 1954) (hereinafter cited as
DAVIs) ; Thayer, Irrevocable Credits in International Commerce: Their Legal Effects,
37 CoLum. L. REv. 1326 (1937). While most of the credits which will be considered here
are irrevocable, confirmed and straight, the distinctions are of but incidental importance
with the possible exception of the "clean"-"documentary" dichotomy. See note 34 infra
and accompanying text.
The "travelers' letter of credit" is a different animal, retaining the family name for
geneological reasons but otherwise unrelated to the present context. See Hershey, supra
at 4-9.
LETTERS OF CREDIT
THE LETTER OF CREDIT AS PROTECTION FOR A PERFORMER
Commercial letters of credit have traditionally been used to provide payment
for international sales. 3 The buyer requests his bank to open a letter of credit
naming his foreign supplier as beneficiary. 4 The seller obtains immediate pay-
ment for the goods shipped abroad when he presents specified shipping docu-
ments to the local bank which has confirmed the letter of credit5 The confirming
bank is obligated to pay upon presentation of conforming documents, irrespec-
tive of the seller's compliance with other terms of the underlying sales contract. 6
The confirming bank is then entitled to reimbursement from the bank issuing
the letter of credit,7 which in turn collects from the buyer.8
3. Von Klemperer, Present Foreign Paynent Practices in the United States, 2 INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY FUND, STAFF PAPERS 199, 201 (1951-52) ; ORGANIZATION FOR EuRo-
PEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION, THE OEEC BANKERS' MISSION TO THE U.S.A., TECHNICAL
AssIsTANcE MISSION No. 31, REPORT ON UNIFORM RULES AND PRACTIcE RELATING TO
COmmmCIAL LETrERS OF CRElT, Annex V (Sept. 1951). Letters of credit were first issued
in any quantity in this country following World War I. ROSENTHAL, Op. Cit. supra note
2, at 341-42. But while their principal use has been in connection with foreign trade, the
possibility of adapting the mechanism to domestic financing requirements has been recognized
for some time. Llewellyn, Some Advantages of Letters of Credit, 2 J. Bus. U. CHI.
1, 11 (1929). See Drinc-O-Matic, Inc. v. Frank, 141 F2d 177 (2d Cir. 1944)
(soda dispensing machines) ; Consolidated Sales Co. v. Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Va.
307, 313-14, 68 S.E.2d 652, 656-57 (1952) (electrical appliances).
4. Today almost all commercial letters of credit are issued by banks. One of the
original purposes of introducing the banks to such international sales transactions was
to provide credit at banking rates rather than at the higher mercantile credit rate.
WARD & HARFIELD 7-8, 26-27; GumRiDmE & MEGRAH 4; Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 5, 14.
In banking terminology, the party who requests his bank to open a letter of credit for
the benefit of another is referred to as the "customer."
5. This result has two advantages. The seller has obtained payment for the goods
while they are still in transit; thus he avoids the risk of being in an unfavorable bargaining
position should an unscrupulous buyer choose to reject otherwise satisfactory goods in
the hope of being able to settle for a cheaper price. And the seller is better able to use
the buyer's payment to finance his own suppliers. McGowan, Assignability of Documentary
Credits, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 666 (1948).
6. Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925);
Laudisi v. American Exchange Nat'l Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 347 (1924) ; Urquhart
Lindsay v. Eastern Bank, Ltd., [1922] 1 K.B. 318. See WAU & IRFIEuD 45; DAvis 124.
7. The confirming or advising bank usually looks to the issuing bank and not to the
buyer, with whom it has had no dealings. The confirming or advising bank which has
become the paying bank by virtue of honoring the beneficiary's drafts may be able to collect
even if the documents against which it has made payment are not conforming, so long as
it offers to indemnify the issuing bank from any loss that might arise as the result of the
disparity in the documents. Dixon, Irmaos & Cia v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 144 F.2d 759
(2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945). See Backus & Harfield, Custom and
Letters of Credit: The Dixon Irmaos Case, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 589 (1952).
Whether the confirming bank would have any rights against the buyer or not would
be decided by the facts of the particular case and any agreement that could be implied
between them. Royal Card & Paper Co. v. Dresdner Bank, 27 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1928) ;
Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. National City Bank, 20 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
275 U.S. 497 (1927).
The same right of reimbursement arises for an issuing bank as against a correspondent
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Secondary Means of Payment
Recent banking practice has demonstrated how this simple mechanism can
be employed to provide a substitute method of payment in the event the buyer
does not satisfy his contractual obligation in the manner anticipated by the
parties.9 In contrast to standard procedure, the letter of credit so used serves
as a secondary rather than the primary means of paying a foreign supplier.10
Such a device proved ideal for an Australian importer who ordered farm
machinery from an American manufacturer and planned to make payment
with funds that would become available in Canada at a later date." The Ameri-
can seller, who did not insist upon immediate payment, was confident that the
financing contemplated by the Australian buyer would materialize. Still, there
was no reason to take unnecessary risks with a new customer. Ordinarily he
would have asked the buyer for an irrevocable letter of credit naming himself
as beneficiary; this would have given him the unqualified promise of an American
bank to pay against his presentation of shipping documents. In the instant
case, the parties arranged for such a letter of credit, and further provided that
the seller could receive payment by presenting copies of the documents to the
confirming bank. Thus protected, the seller could proceed to make the shipment,
forwarding the originals of the documents, and to await his money through
the channel preferred by the buyer. Should the latter fail to meet his obligation
through the Canadian connection, the seller could then turn to the American
bank for payment.
Although such a procedure accommodates the particular needs of the parties,
the establishment of alternative means of payment interjects factors not present
(usually inland) bank which has requested that the letter of credit be issued. Asbury Park
& Ocean Grove Bank v. National City Bank, 35 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd
mere., 268 App. Div. 984, 52 N.Y.S2d 583 (1944), appeal denied, 269 App. Div. 656, 53
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1st Dep't 1945) (issuing bank permitted to sell securities deposited by
requesting correspondent).
8. E.g., French Am. Banking Corp. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 126 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd mere., 282 App. Div. 1024, 126 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1st Dep't 1953), 307 N.Y. 616,
120 N.E.2d 826 (1954). But the beneficiary himself may have no rights against the buyer
should the bank not pay against drafts which it has accepted. Vivacqua Irmaos, S.A. v.
Hickerson, 193 La. 495, 190 So. 657 (1939) (bank failed).
The buyer is inclined to think in terms of the goods and not of the separate obligation
to pay for the documents. Harfield, The National Bank Act and Foreign Trade Practices,
61 HARv. L. REv. 782, 784-85 (1948). But so long as the documents are satisfactory, he
cannot refuse to reimburse the bank because the seller failed to satisfy the terms of the
sales contract. See note 6 supra, notes 25, 36 infra.
9. INTE ivEws. The introduction of a condition to the promise of reimbursement does
not render the instrument any less a letter of credit. DAvis 12.
10. The use of the word "secondary," as referring to a method of payment to which
the parties will resort only in the event of the failure of a preferred method, must not be
confused with the reference in suretyship law to a "secondary obligation." In these letter
of credit cases the secondary means of payment is a primary obligation of the issuing
bank. McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, 35 HARV. L. Rnv. 539, 715, 738 (1922).




in the standard use of the letter of credit. 12 While the seller is awaiting pay-
ment from Canada, the buyer may receive the goods and deem them non-
conforming. Should he then inform the bank issuing the letter of credit, the
latter might advise its correspondent to refuse payment. This development is
contrary to the intent of an irrevocable letter of credit, but in practical terms
the confirming bank, given such notice, will often make an effort to delay
payment. 13 In the meantime, the buyer could take direct action against his
supplier. 14 This problem seldom arises in the usual letter of credit situation,
since the seller has in most instances collected from the confirming bank prior
to the buyer's receipt of the goods.'3 Using the letter of credit as a secondary
method of payment also creates risks for the buyer, who must be careful to
avoid making payment twice. An unscrupulous seller might accept funds from
the Canadian source and then use copies of the documents to collect on the ir-
revocable letter of credit.' 6 To guard against this contingency, the buyer should
require the seller to surrender the copies of the shipping documents as a condi-
tion of obtaining payment through the Canadian channel. 17
12. It should be noted that the risk assumed by the issuing bank may be greater when
the letter of credit is a secondary rather than the primary source of payment. In the
standard letter of credit situation, originals of the shipping documents will be presented
to the bank as a condition of the seller's obtaining payment. If the buyer who authorized
the letter of credit is insolvent, the issuing bank which he is obligated to reimburse will
at least enjoy a lien on the goods by virtue of possessing the shipping documents.
HvIDT, BANKERS' CREDITS 79-90 (1933). Where the letter of credit serves as a secondary
means of payment, the beneficiary collects against copies of the documents; possession of
the copies will not suffice to give the bank a comparable lien. 2 WILLISTON, SALES § 441
(rev. ed. 1948). However, the issuer will in all likelihood have demanded collateral security
when the credit is opened. Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 807, 835 n.152 (1956).
13. Cf. note 60 infra.
14. Action directly against the seller is the buyer's only remedy. The courts frown
on an attempt to enjoin payment by the bank to the seller rendering documentary
performance. E.g., Williams Ice Cream Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 210 App. Div. 179,
205 N.Y. Supp. 446 (1st Dep't 1924). But see Bank of Montreal v. Recknagel, 109 N.Y.
482, 17 N.E. 217 (1888) (discrepancy between goods and documents was evidence of
fraud) ; note 61 infra.
15. Although the goods are normally inspected, the inspection is usually made by a
party other than the buyer and the result appears as a certificate or warranty among the
other documents. The seller requests a letter of credit in the first instance in order to obtain
prompt payment rather than await his buyer's approval. See note 5 supra.
16. It is doubtful whether the buyer could invoke judicial aid to prevent this result.
See note 14 supra. Occasionally customers who had requested letters of credit have argued,
to no avail, that courts should intervene because the beneficiary did nothing to merit pay-
ment, Nacional Financiera, S.A. v. Banco de Ponce, 275 App. Div. 827, 89 N.Y.S.2d 480
(1st Dep't 1949), or because the particular goods for which the letter of credit was drawn
were obtained in another manner, North Am. Manufacturers Export Associates, Inc. v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 77 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). These cases come as close as any
reported to posing the suggested problem of double payment; the answer they indicate
conforms to strict commercial practice. See notes 3-8 supra and accompanying text.
17. Because of the possibility that the seller might have several copies of the shipping
documents, the safest course for the buyer to take might be to require cancellation of the
letter of credit as a condition of payment from the preferred source. Cf. Bank of America
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Use of a letter of credit as a supplier's secondary source of payment was de-
veloped by the Commodity Credit Corporation in its transactions with American
exporters.' 8 The CCC is willing to provide dealers with surplus grain to be
shipped abroad, but wants in exchange an equivalent value of strategic materials
rather than cash. So far as the CCC is concerned, a barter transaction is con-
templated.' 9 However, to protect itself the CCC requests a letter of credit which
assures payment in cash should the exporter be unable to procure the stipulated
materials. Immediately upon delivering the grain the CCC is eligible for pay-
ment under the letter of credit, absent a clause allowing the exporter a reason-
able time to perform. But rather than collect from the bank, the CCC will
reserve such right of payment until the exporter delivers the strategic materials
and the CCC has had an opportunity to inspect them. If the goods are found
to be satisfactory, the CCC will allow the exporter's bank to cancel the letter of
credit. Should the exporter deliver the goods in installments, the CCC will
advise the bank to reduce the amount of the letter of credit pro tanto until
it is closed out upon the completion of the barter.
Reimbursement for a Surety
In the standard letter of credit situation, the buyer and seller anticipate that
goods will be shipped and the debt which thereby arises discharged through
the letter of credit. In the modifications of this pattern discussed above, the
letter of credit has served as an alternative means of payment to be utilized
only on the additional contingency that the preferred method fail; the parties
anticipate the existence of a debt even if the letter of credit is not used to
discharge it. When parties are doubtful whether or not a debt will be owed,
they have sometimes employed the letter of credit to provide payment in the
event that the obligation does spring into existence. Thus, in contrast to the
Australian and CCC examples, the contingency determining the use of the
letter of credit is not the failure of payment from a preferred source but the
prospect of a debt not certain to arise.2 0
The contingent liability of a surety who has posted a bond is an example of
an uncertain debt as the basis for a letter of credit. When the Swedish liner
STOCKHOLM was libeled for amounts far in excess of its value by those who had
sustained losses in its collision with the ANDREA DORIA the Swedish govern-
v. Whitney-Central Nat'l Bank, 291 Fed. 929, 935-36 (5th Cir. 1923) (other shipping
documents required to verify copies).
18. INTERVIEWS.
19. The dollar volume of this bartering has been doubling each year. Since 1950, crop
exchanges have risen from less than $8,000,000 per year to more than $300,000,000 in the
fiscal year 1956. In the first seven months of fiscal 1957 the amount of crops released ha,
already reached twice the figure for 1956; $167,000,000 worth of lead, zinc, titanium and
bauxite have been obtained as against $105,000,000 last year. Business Week, far. 16,
1957, p. 153.
20. Reference here is specifically to the underlying debt and not just to the obligation




ment was faced with the problem of obtaining the ship's release so that it
might continue operations pending settlement. The court required the Swedish
government to furnish a bond for $5,000,000, the maximum value of the STOCx-
HOLM and the probable limit of the owner's liability. In order to obtain such
a bond, the government was obliged to have the Bank of Sweden issue, and
an American bank confirm, a letter of credit naming as beneficiary the American
company which was to post the bond.21 If the surety were forced to pay out
under the bond, it could easily collect from the confirming bank the resulting
debt owed by the Swedish government. The opening of a confirmed letter of
credit was the simplest and cheapest manner of providing the bonding company
with security, since the burden of depositing funds in escrow was avoided.
A situation with similar ingredients, though with overtones even further
removed from the commercial arena, is the case of a bond posted in a New
York court to assure compliance with a separation decree. The husband, who
had obtained custody of the child, was ordered to make the child available to
the wife for stipulated periods during the year.22 The requirement for posting
a bond was complicated by the fact that the husband lived in Bermuda and
was unable to provide security in America to the surety furnishing the bond.
To obtain the bond, the husband acquired from his bank in Bermuda a letter of
credit drawn in favor of the American surety company. The letter of credit
was so worded that had the husband defaulted on his decree, the surety com-
pany would have been able to collect from the Bermuda bank's American cor-
respondent the amount it was obligated to pay into court.
THE LETTER OF CREDIT AS PROTECTION FOR A PAYOR
In the preceding groups of cases, as in the traditional use of the instrument,
the party authorizing the letter of credit would not be personally obligated to
make payment to the beneficiary until the latter had performed a contractual
obligation for his benefit.23 Thus the Australian buyer was not obligated to
21. INmviv Vs.
22. INTERVIEws. Cf. Beekwilder v. Beekwilder, 29 N.J. Super. 351, 102 A.2d 642
(App. Div. 1953) (penal bond posted to assure delivery of children was forfeited to court,
mother recovering damages and court retaining balance as fine) ; Miles v. Miles, 158 Atl. 449
(N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1932).
23. Of course the bank issuing the letter of credit is obligated to make payment to
the beneficiary upon his documentary performance, regardless of his right to collect upon
the underlying sales contract. See notes 6-8 supra, notes 25, 36 infra, and accompanying
text. Letters of credit have also been drawn to enable the beneficiary to obtain part pay-
ment in advance of his documentary performance. This would be the case with a letter
of credit the beneficiary could pledge or assign, or the right to payment under which he
would be allowed to transfer to facilitate his own financing of the transaction. McGowan,
Assignability of Documentary Credits, 13 LAw & CoNMIAsP. PROB. 666 (1948). This
might also be said to be the case with those credits bearing a "Red Clause" which in effect
gives the beneficiary even broader powers to draw drafts prior to presentation of documents.
Oelbermann v. National City Bank, 79 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1935), modified, 298 U.S. 638
(1936). But see Grace v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 94, 38 N.E.2d 449
(1941).
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the American seller until the requested goods were received, and delivery of
grain to the exporter was a condition precedent to the maturity of his indebted-
ness to the CCC. Similarly, the Swedish government and the Bermudian were
not liable to the surety companies until the latter were required to make pay-
ment under the bonds. The letter of credit has also been employed to provide
protection for a "payor" by a "performer"; that is, the party obligated
by the underlying contract to tender performance establishes a letter of credit
for the benefit of the party who is to pay for the performance once it has been
received. As in the surety cases discussed above, the contingency determining
whether the letter of credit will ever be utilized by the beneficiary is the possi-
bility of a future debt not certain to be claimed. Whether the debt will in fact
be asserted is dependent upon the beneficiary's belief as to the quality of the
seller's performance.
Losses in Arranging Imports
The letter of credit opened by the performer and naming the payor as bene-
ficiary is a protective device popular with Greek buyers who must incur com-
paratively large expenses in arranging an import.2 4 Should the American seller
breach, the Greek buyer might have to forfeit sums which he has been required
by his government to deposit with a bank. To cover such a loss, the buyer
requires the Arderican seller to open a letter of credit for a percentage of the
value of the goods ordered. The Greek buyer can then recover any expenses
he must bear by collecting under the letter of credit. A certificate attesting
non-performance takes the place of the documents normally presented to a con-
firming bank. The sole responsibility of the bank is to determine whether the
presented documents conform to the requirements specified in the letter of
credit 2 5
24. The amount which the importer must deposit with his bank (in terms of the
percentage of the value of the goods to be imported), and the sum forfeited if the
import is not effected as planned, vary with the nature of the commodity. INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 1956, at 149,
151-53.
Greece's precarious foreign exchange situation after World War II required a certificate
system of allocating such foreign exchange as was available. Under such a system an
importer who buys a foreign exchange certificate and then finds he has no use for it
because goods are not delivered can suffer a loss. See MIKESELL, FOREIGN EXCHANGE
IN THE POSTWAR WORLD 174, 297-99 (1954). Although the foreign exchange certificate
system was terminated in Greece in 1952, the letter of credit device described in the text
may have been used when the system was in effect to ensure reimbursement for such a loss.
25. The bank may require strict compliance with the specifications of the letter of
credit. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 218 F.2d
831, 840-41 (10th Cir. 1955) (draft drawn after expiration date not honored) ; Courteen
Seed Co. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., 216 App., Div. 495, 499, 215 N.Y.
Supp. 525, 529-30 (1st Dep't 1926), aff'd, 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927). The bank
is under no duty to look behind the documents. Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park
Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925).
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Faulty Performance of a Construction Contract
Another example of a letter of credit opened by a performer for a payor was
the instrument demanded by the Siamese government as a condition of award-
ing a contract to an American builder for the construction of a harbor.26 The
government, beneficiary of the letter of credit, designated the amount of the
credit; the sum was based upon the damages which might arise from unsatis-
factory performance, over and above the recoupment available by not paying
for such partial performance as was actually rendered. The government would
have been entitled to collect under the letter of credit upon the contractor's failure
to perform satisfactorily and the government's certification to the bank that a
breach had occurred. The contractor who authorizes such a letter of credit is
of course exposing himself to several risks. Since the bank must pay out upon
the presentation by the beneficiary of a certificate alleging a breach of contract,
the contractor is subjected to a unilateral determination by the beneficiary of
the quality of the contractor's performance. Moreover, since performance by
the beneficiary is not a condition precedent to the right of payment under the
letter of credit,2 7 the contractor could conceivably be refused payment by the
government for the harbor installation and also be forced to reimburse the
bank paying under the letter of credit. This risk of double performance-once
by fulfilling the contractual obligation and once by paying under the letter
of credit-is not unlike the dilemma faced by the buyer in the cases where the
letter of credit was utilized as a secondary means of payment.28 But while the
buyer in these cases could protect himself by requiring surrender of the docu-
ments, 29 analogous protection is not available to the contractor in the instant
case, since payment under the letter of credit is contingent solely on the
beneficiary's declaration of unsatisfactory performance.
Letters of credit designed to protect a buyer against faulty performance have
also been used in connection with shipbuilding contracts. For example, a
Japanese yard that is to build the ship opens a letter of credit which names
as beneficiary the party ordering the ship. If the construction is not completed
by the specified date, or if the builder otherwise fails to meet his contractual
obligation, the letter of credit is a source of compensation for any resulting
loss. 0
THE "NEw" LETTER OF CREDIT AND THE BANKS
Fees
The recent extension in the use of letters of credit has both practical and
legal implications for the banks issuing such instruments. Already they have
26. INTmVimvs.
27. See pages 907-08 .mpra.
23. See notes 9-19 supra and accompanying text.
29. See note 17 supra.
30. This credit should not be confused with the one running to the shipbuilder. The
letter of credit mechanism has also been made available to assure the shipbuilder of financ-
ing as he completes construction. INTFRWviws.
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made appropriate mechanical adjustments. A common practice has been for the
bank to charge the customer requesting issuance of a credit on two separate
occasions: when the instrument is issued and when payment is made under it.2 '
But if the letter of credit is a secondary means of payment, or is to be utilized
only upon the happening of a contingency the occurence of which is doubtful,
experience has shown that the beneficiary rarely demands payment and the
letter of credit is simply permitted to lapse.3 2 Because banks believed they
were not adequately compensated for the risk assumed when the customer
made only one payment under the traditional schedule of charges, they were
led to revise their practice as to those instruments under which future payment
is unlikely. They now charge a flat fee on the opening of such a letter of credit,
a sum geared both to the amount of the credit and to the length of time it is to
remain valid. 83
Documents
Banks have also realized that modern developments in the use of letters
of credit have radically changed the nature of the documents which the bene-
ficiary must present to them to obtain payment.34 Admittedly in the Australian
31. Actually there is no uniform method of payment, let alone a standard charge, for
letters of credit But because there are costs which arise in connection with having the
letter of credit confirmed, advised and paid, splitting the charge in this manner has been
practiced by several banks. INTERvIEWs.
The nature of the security which the bank often requires the customer to deposit before
it will extend credit is influential in determining the charge that will be levied. Ibid. See
Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank v. National City Bank, 35 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd inern., 268 App. Div. 984, 52 N.Y.S.2d 583, appeal denied, 269 App. Div. 656,
53 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1st Dep't 1944).
32. For example, bankers interviewed know of no instance in which the CCC has
resorted to a letter of credit for payment because of the failure of a grain exporter
to deliver strategic materials.
33. The new kind of letter of credit described in text is opened for a given period of
time, usually no longer than one year. The flat fee which will be charged for the credit
may be made payable quarterly. In the event the credit is terminated prior to its expiration
date, the bank, at its discretion, may not require payment for subsequent quarters. INTEI-
ViEws.
34. Of the several variations in form of the letter of credit, see note 2 supra, the distinc-
tion between a clean and a documentary credit is of most significance in the present
context. The bank issuing a clean letter of credit undertakes to pay drafts drawn upon it
without any documents attached. Bills drawn under a documentary letter of credit will
be honored only if they have attached to them specified documents, e.g., seller's invoice,
bill of lading, insurance policy, consular invoice, certificate of weight or quality, export
license. Compare "Clean Letter of Credit," FINKELSTEIN 297, with "Irrevocable Straight
Letter of Credit," id. at 300. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Banco Nacional de
Nicaragua, 231 Ala. 614, 166 So. 8 (1936), judgment aff'd on new ophdon, 238 Ala. 128,
189 So. 191 (1939).
In addition to documents, there are other conditions which can be written into a letter
of credit. Commercial Union of America v. Anglo-South American Bank, Ltd., 16 F.2d 979
(2d Cir. 1927) (credit required specific sailing time) ; United States Steel Products Co.
v. Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co., 9 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1925) (credit required goods not
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and CCC cases the documents specified in the letters of credit were sub-
stantially the same as would be required in the standard use of the instrument.
But a written notice of payment under a surety bond, or a certficate attesting
unsatisfactory performance of a contract, is hardly characteristic of the kind
of document which banks have traditionally inspected for conformity. The
extreme case in this respect was that of the attorney who required his client
to open a letter of credit to assure him payment for securing a divorce. 35 The
parties agreed that the divorce papers would constitute the documents which
would be presented to the bank by the attorney-beneficiary. A bank is entitled
to reimbursement as long as the documents against which it makes payment
accord with the requirements set out in the letter of credit. 36 Accordingly, the
wide variety of unique documents which may be presented offer an increased
risk that the bank will be charged with improper payment.3 7
Problems of Ultra Vires
National and state banks generally lack the statutory power to guarantee the
indebtedness of other parties.38 The commercial letter of credit, as traditionally
be shipped before June) ; Banco Nacional de Credito v. Bank of America, 118 F. Supp.
303 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (reinstatement of credit required advice that documents had been
forwarded). Whether a bank is under any greater duty to investigate the representation
of the fulfillment of such conditions than it is to ascertain the facts behind shipping docu-
ments is basic to the present discussion. For the sake of conformity and commercial ex-
pediency there should be no greater burden on the banks. But notice to the bank of non-
occurrence of such a condition may defeat the beneficiary's right to payment while notice
of non-conforming goods behind conforming documents would have no such effect. Compare
Commercial Union of America v. Anglo-South American Bank, supra, with Continental
Nat'l Bank v. National City Bank, 69 F2d 312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 557 (1934).
35. INMaVnWS.
36. E.g., C. Lievense, Ltd., v. Credit Suisse, 285 App. Div. 1046, 140 N.Y.S2d 3 (1st
Dep't 1955) (letter from bank holding warehouse receipts satisfied requirement). See
notes 25, 34 supra and accompanying text.
37. As a general rule, the bank must pay only if the documents are in "strict" com-
pliance with the terms of the credit. E.g., Crocker First Nat'l Bank v. De Sousa, 27 F.2d
462 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 650 (1928); Lamborn v. Lake Shore Banking &
Trust Co., 196 App. Div. 504, 188 N.Y. Supp. 162 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 616, 132
N.E. 911 (1921). However, when the bank seeks reimbursement from its customer, com-
pliance requirements are usually more relaxed. See authorities cited Comment, 62 YALE
L.J. 227, 248 n.107 (1953).
38. 1 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING § 65, n.1 (6th ed. 1928); 6 FLETcHR, CycLOP-DiA
oF CoRPORATIoNs § 2592 (1950). The prohibition is actually based on a negative inference
from statutes and bank charters. National banks, for example, have only such powers as
they are expressly given. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 48-50 (1940) ;
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 253 (1934) (national banks not allowed to
pledge assets to secure deposits). The same is true with respect to state banks. Smyth
v. Kaspar Am. State Bank, 9 Ill. 2d 27, 136 N.E.2d 796 (1956). Although national banks
are empowered to conduct transactions "necessary to carry on the business of banking,"
REV. STAT. 5136 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (Supp. 1956), the issuance of
guaranties is not generally considered integral to banking practice. See authorities cited
in Harfield, The National Bank Act and Foreign Trade Practices, 61 HARV. L. REV.
782, 788 n.12 (1948). Thus, in the absence of an express grant, bank guaranties are ultra
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used, has been held not to constitute a guaranty.30 Courts have reasoned that
the issuing bank is not responsible for the debt of another; rather, it incurs a
distinct, independent obligation to pay the beneficiary upon presentation of
conforming documents, regardless of the liability of the buyer on the underlying
sales contract.40 If this reasoning is not equally applicable to the recent uses
vires acts. Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Baird, 160 Fed. 642, 645 (8th Cir. 1908) ; Harfield,
supra at 795.
There are some state banks to which the power to issue guaranties has been expressly
granted. INTERVIEWS.
39. "[The letter of credit] is not analogous to the situation which prevails in surety-
ship; the [buyer] could assert or fail to assert its rights against the seller under the sales
contract, and its action in that regard has no bearing upon its rights under the inde-
pendent letter of credit contract with these [banks]." Overseas Trading Corp. v. Irving
Trust Co., 82 N.Y.S.2d 72, 76 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
See Campbell, Guaranties and the Suretyship Phases of Letters of Credit, 85 U. PA. L.
Ray. 175, 261 (1936) ; Trimble, The Implied Power of National Banks to Issue Letters
of Credit and Accept Bills, 58 YALE L.J. 713 (1949). See also Consolidated Sales Co. v.
Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Va. 307, 68 S.E.2d 652 (1952) ; DAvis 59-60; FIrNKLSTrIN
32-42; GUTnERIDGE & MEGRAH 17.
The power to issue letters of credit is often granted by statute. See 41 STAT. 378 (1919),
as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 615 (Supp. 1956) (national banks engaged in foreign transac-
tions) ; CAL. FiN. CODE ANN. § 1224 (Deering Supp. 1955) (documentary credits may
be issued in specified transactions involving the sale of goods) ; N.Y. BANKING LAW §
96(2). Since letters of credit are in every-day commercial usage, the power to issue them
may also be implied from statutory grants to engage in activities "necessary to carry on
the business of banking." See note 38 supra; Llewellyn, quoted in WAu & HArErD 68-72;
Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 227, 231 n.24 (1953).
40. "Unless express conditions are contained in the letter of credit, the performance
of the sales contract between the buyer and seller is not a condition precedent of the
credit or of the buyer's agreement to reimburse. The letter of credit is a wholly inde-
pendent contract ... ." Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441,
96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 787 (Sup. Ct. 1949). See American Steel Co. v. Irving Nat'l Bank,
266 Fed. 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1920) (letter of credit held to be contract between plaintiff-
beneficiary and defendant-issuing bank; bank required to pay) ; Lamborn v. Lake Shore
Banking and Trust Co., 196 App. Div. 504, 188 N.Y. Supp. 162 (1st Dep't), aff'd per curiam,
231 N.Y. 616, 132 N.E. 911 (1921) (bank not required to pay on its contract with bene-
ficiary although goods satisfied sales contract).
The independence of the bank's undertaking is reflected in several ways. Payment by
the bank not in accordance with the terms of the credit gives the bank no right of reim-
bursement; furthermore, any deposit which the customer may make with the bank to
secure the letter of credit is not to be considered as payment to the seller by the buyer.
Caloric Stove Corp. v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 205 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1953); Citizens
Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank v. Londono, 204 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir. 1953) (concurring
opinion) (same).
Other arguments have been made to refute the contention that the bank's undertaking
on a credit constitutes a guaranty. The buyer and seller are able to amend the underlying
sales contract in a manner that would vitiate any guaranty by a third party, and there is
no requirement of the bank's having knowledge of seller's acceptance of the "guaranty"
as a condition of being bound. Lamborn v. National Park Bank, 212 App. Div. 25, 208 N.Y.
Supp. 428 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 240 N.Y. 520, 148 N.E. 664 (1925). See Lane Bros. Co. v.
Sheinwald, 275 Mass. 96, 175 N.E. 148 (1931) ; Hershey, Letters of Credit, 32 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1918).
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of the letter of credit, then these transactions may conceivably be branded ultra
vires.41
Where the letter of credit is a secondary means of payment, the bank is
in reality guaranteeing payment to the seller in the event that the buyer does
not make payment from a preferred source. However, the seller" does have
a right to collect under the letter of credit as soon as the goods are shipped;
the bank must pay even though the beneficiary has made no attempt to obtain
payment in the manner anticipated by the parties. In this respect the letter
of credit still constitutes an independent obligation of the bank to the bene-
ficiary, rather than a promise to pay in case the buyer does not. Had the
parties provided that the beneficiary could not collect on the letter of credit
until he certified he could not obtain payment from the preferred source, the
transaction might well have been deemed a guaranty, and subject to attack
as ultra vires.
When a surety company has been named beneficiary of a letter of credit
and is thereby enabled to recoup the sums paid out under a bond, the effect
of the arrangement for the surety company is one of indemnity. Likewise, the
customer who has provided the surety company with the letter of credit has
done so with the express purpose of facilitating reimbursement. If the bank
is itself deemed to have issued an indemnity, it will probably have acted ultra
vires, since an agreement to indemnify is subject to the same proscription as
a contract of guaranty.42
An "ultra vires" assertion could be supported by the seeming absence in
these cases of independent liabilities. In the standard letter of credit situation,
the performance which obligates the bank to pay the beneficiary is not the same
as the performance which gives the seller rights against the buyer. The bank
must pay upon presentation of conforming documents; the buyer must pay
upon delivery of conforming goods.43 The fact that the bank may be liable
though the buyer is not personally indebted is the reason why the letter of
credit has been considered an independent obligation and not a promise to
answer for the debt of another. When a letter of credit is a device to reimburse
a surety, it may be contended that the foregoing analysis is inapplicable on
the following grounds: the duty of the bank to pay the surety arises when
the latter pays money to discharge an obligation of the party authorizing the
letter of credit. Such payment under the bond simultaneously creates for the
surety rights of reimbursement against the party for whose benefit the bond
had been posted. Accordingly, any claim that the bank is not responding for
another's debt is erroneous, since the party authorizing the letter of credit
41. Since the prohibition against guaranties is based solely on a negative inference,
see note 3S supra, it may be argued that where a bank is expressly empowered to issue a
ltter of credit, see note 39 supra, a credit which is considered a guaranty is nonetheless valid.
However, because of the settled rule against guaranties, a court might still be unwilling
to extend the letter of credit mechanism beyond its traditional non-guaranty use.
42. 7 MIcHiE, BANKS AND BANKING § 163 (perm. ed. 1944); WARD & HAMFMiD 60.
43. See notes 3-8 supra and accompanying text.
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becomes personally indebted by the same performance as gives rise to rights
against the bank.
This argument could be countered by the contention that the obligation of
the bank to the beneficiary technically arises not when the surety has in fact
paid out under the bond, but when the surety certifies to the bank that it has
made such a payment. Thus, if a surety falsely certified that money has been
expended, the bank would be obligated to pay against the presentation of con-
forming documents; unlike the party for whom the bond had been posted, the
bank could not defend on the ground that no payment had actually been made.44
Although it is highly unlikely that the surety would falsely certify payment, the
very fact that the bank would have to pay if it did is an indication that the
bank has issued a letter of credit and not an indemnity contract or guaranty.
Moreover, the surety might pay out under the bond in the mistaken belief that
the party for whom the bond was posted was liable to the party paid.4r
Under these circumstances, the surety would be entitled to collect from the
bank, but such payment could not be deemed in discharge of the debt of another,
since the surety would have no right to collect directly from the party it had
bonded.4 6
When a letter of credit is used as source of compensation for unsatisfactory
performance by a seller,47 the nature of the bank's undertaking raises the same
44. Non-payment behind an otherwise regular certificate would constitute no greater
defense than non-delivery behind conforming documents. See Maurice O'Meara Co. v.
National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925) ; note 34 supra.
False documents present a difficult problem. The risk of forged instruments is on the
buyer; paying or negotiating banks do not warrant that the documents are genuine. See
DAvis 155-66; FixNI~smx 246-48; GuTrymGE & MEGRAN 101-04; WARD & HARMIoLD
54-55.
45. Payment by the surety under a mistake of fact would give it no right of reimburse-
ment against the principal debtor unless that mistake of fact were occasioned by a mis-
representation or act, such as release of security, on the part of the principal. AIRANT,
SuiRsHIP AND GUARANTY §§ 62, 73 (1931).
46. Some of the cases which have considered whether a letter of credit is a guaranty
contain language which might be the basis of an additional contention that the letter of
credit extended to the surety is not ultra vires. These cases imply that the bank is not a
guarantor because it is obligated to pay the beneficiary, even though the latter has made
no effort to collect the price of the goods from the buyer who is liable on the underlying
sales contract In terms of the common law of guaranty, such an observation would seem
to indicate only that the bank is a guarantor of payment and not of collection. See STURGES,
CREDIT TRANSACrIoNs 2, 46-50 (4th ed. 1955). However, some courts have apparently
felt that, since the bank must pay prior to any demand upon the buyer, the bank incurs a
"primary obligation" which should not be deemed an ultra vires guaranty. See, c.g.,
Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 441, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 787
(Sup. Ct. 1949) ; Overseas Trading Corp. v. Irving Trust Co., 82 N.Y.S.2d 72 (Sup. Ct.
1948). If a court accepts this theory, the letter of credit for the surety will not be held
ultra vires, since demand upon the bonded party for reimbursement is not a condition
precedent to the bank's duty to pay. A similar argument against ultra vires could be made
as to every letter of credit which does not require the beneficiary to look initially to the
resources of the party authorizing the instrument.
47. See text at notes 23-30 supra.
(Vol. 66: 902
LETTERS OF CREDIT
question of an ultra -ires guaranty. In reality, the bank which pays the bene-
ficiary of such a letter of credit may be said to answer for the unliquidated debt
of the performer arising from his breach. Yet, the bank must make payment
upon the beneficiary's allegation that a breach has occurred; the seller who has
authorized the letter of credit would be personally indebted to the buyer only
if a breach had in fact occurred, as evidenced by a judgment awarding damages.
Thus the letter of credit may again be deemed an "independent obligation" of
the bank rather than a guaranty, since the bank might be indebted to the bene-
ficiary while the seller was not.
Even assuming that a letter of credit could be proven ultra vires, a customer
who had requested that the letter of credit be opened would probably be estopped
from refusing the bank's demand for reimbursement on that ground.48 How-
ever, a bank, either on its own motion 49 or on behalf of the customer, may
be able to assert ultra vires as a reason for refusing payment to a beneficiary
who had complied with the terms of an irrevocable letter of credit. 0 The
48. Ultra vires is not favored by the courts as a defense. 7 Fi.mcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
CORI'oRATIONS § 3407 (1931). A party dealing with a corporation is estopped if the corpora-
tion has acted in reliance on the contract sought to be invalidated. Id. § 3409. Such reliance
would clearly seem to have occurred if the bank has paid the beneficiary under the credit.
Knowledge on the customer's part that the bank's guaranty would be outside its powers
is grounds for estoppel against the customer. Bowen v. Needles Nat'l Bank, 87 Fed. 430,
443 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1898); Kaplan v. Topinka, 291 Ill. App. 222, 9 N.E.2d 470 (1937).
Persons dealing with a national bank are chargeable with knowledge of the limitations
imposed upon it. California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362 (1897); McCormick v.
Market Bank, 165 U.S. 538, 549-50 (1897). The same is true with respect to state
banks. Smyth v. Kaspar Am. State Bank, 9 Ill. 2d 27, 136 N.E.2d 796 (1956). But "the
mere giving of a guaranty or of an undertaking is not in and of itself a wrong, illegal, or
beyond the corporate powers of a bank." American Surety Co. v. Philippine Nat'l
Bank, 245 N.Y. 116, 130-32, 156 N.E. 634, 639-40, cert. denied, 275 U.S. 549 (1927)
(Philippine bank whose charter not entered into evidence held liable on guaranty). "The
contract with the plaintiff on its face was not necessarily beyond the scope of the power
of the bank."
It has been said that only the state, and not a private party, can object to a bank's
undertaking as ultra vires. Kerfoot v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 218 U.S. 281 (1910) ;
Jackman v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 16 F.2d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 1926). But see 7 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA oF CORPORATIONS § 3444 (1931).
49. The bank would be likely to act on its own motion if it would be unable to obtain
reimbursement for any sums paid the beneficiary because of the customer's present insolvency.
In addition, the bank would lack a security interest in goods which it enjoys under the
standard letter of credit. See note 12 supra.
50. So long as an ultra vires contract is still wholly executory, an action cannot be
maintained against the corporation on the contract in most jurisdictions. 7 FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF COR'ORATIrONs § 3460 (1931). However, if the beneficiary has acted in
reliance upon the irrevocable letter of credit which the bank has been paid to open, the
contract could not be considered executory. Despite such reliance on the part of the bene-
ficiary, under the so-called federal rule the bank could still urge ultra vires as a
valid defense to payment: the ultra vires contract would be void and unenforce-
able. Awotin v. Atlas Exchange Nat'l Bank, 295 U.S. 209 (1935); California
Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362 (1897). The bank would not be estopped to
deny its validity. Cassatt v. First Nat'l Bank, 9 N.J. Misc. 848, 156 Atl. 278 (Sup. Ct.
1931), aff'd, 111 N.J.L. 536, 168 Atl. 585 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933) ; Century Federal Say.
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ultra vires question might also be raised by shareholders,; 1 by depositors,62
or by bank regulatory authorities anxious to terminate the issuance of thi.
particular kind of letter of credit.53
THE LETTER OF CREDIT AS AN UNENFORCEABLE PENALTY
In addition to the ultra vires question, the recent uses of the letter of credit
raise issues of penalties and liquidated damages. The instruments which were
& Loan Ass'n v. Sullivan, 116 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1952), modified, 281 App. Div. 830,
118 N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d Dep't 1953). See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245,
amended on other grounds, 291 U.S. 649 (1934) (rule of no estoppel declared for corpora-
tions in general). And the beneficiary would be charged with knowledge of the ultra
vires nature of the contract. State Bank v. Benzing, 383 Ill. 40, 48 N.E.2d 333 (1943) ;
Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 354 Ill. 554, 188 N.E. 836, appeal dismissed, 292
U.S. 599 (1934).
Some states deny a corporation the defense of ultra vires where the contract was
entered into in good faith and the corporation has received benefit therefrom. City of
Yonkers v. Downey, 309 U.S. 590 (1940) (New York rule) ; Wagner v. Somerset County
Memorial Park, Inc., 372 Pa. 338,93 A.2d 440 (1953) ; McLean Co. v. Sidebottom, 277 Mass.
158, 178 N.E. 284 (1931). It has been held that such a doctrine, though applicable to
corporations generally, should not be applied to banks. Missouri State Life Ins. Co.
v. Lakeland Star-Telegram Co., 111 Fla. 416, 149 So. 597 (1933). But cf. California
Funding Corp. v. Long Beach Nat'l Bank, 134 Cal. App. 2d 343, 285 P.2d 721 (1955) (act
of bank not necessarily void though ultra vires according to banking laws). Moreov,'r, it
could be contended that the benefit which accrues to the bank from the ultra vires guaranty
(i.e., payment by the customer, or the customer's promise to pay if the fee was not collected
by the time the beneficiary demanded payment from the bank) is not substantial enough
to preclude establishing the ultra vires nature of the contract as a defense. See Hamburg
Bank v. Ouachita Nat'l Bank, 78 F.2d 100, 105 (8th Cir. 1935) ; In re Steele Furniture,
18 F.2d 490 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 758 (1927) ; cf. Evans v. Johnson, 149 Fed.
978 (9th Cir. 1896) (no estoppel because third party, and not corporation, held to have
received benefit from ultra vires guaranty).
If reimbursement could not be obtained from the customer, it is highly doubtful whether
a bank could utilize an ultra vires contention to recover such payments as it may have
already made to the beneficiary. Quintal v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 142 N.Y.
Misc. 657, 663, 255 N.Y. Supp. 259, 263 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd ine. 238 App. Div. 820, 262
N.Y. Supp. 924 (1st Dep't 1933). But cf. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Smith, 56 F.2d 799, 803
(3d Cir. 1932) (deposit of securities with national bank voided).
51. Dissenting shareholders sometimes may sue to enjoin the execution or perform-
ance of an ultra vires contract where neither party to the contract could set up the claim.
7 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS §§ 3443, 3453 (1931).
On the other hand, if the corporation is estopped from bringing an action, the share-
holders of the corporation may also be barred. French v. Long, 42 F.2d 45, 47 (4th Cir.
1930).
52. Fort Worth v. McCamey, 93 F.2d 964, 967 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 571
(1938) (depositors can bring action to void ultra vires pledge despite comptroller's ruling
and receiver's inaction).
53. The stability of banks is a matter of public concern; banking authorities are ex-
pected to investigate the activities of banks in order to discover invalid acts. Continental
Bank & Trust Co. v. Woodall, 239 F.2d 707, 710 (10th Cir. 1957) (continuing duty of




authorized by "performers" for the benefit of "payors" resemble a form of penal
bond. In its modern garb, such a bond would create a duty of payment by the
obligor in the event that the party bound by a contractual obligation does not
render the promised performance within the specified time. 4 In order to collect
from the obligor, the promisee must prove both the execution of the bond
and a failure of performance.1 Moreover, since the law limits the freedom
of contracting parties by refusing to enforce an agreement which imposes a
penalty for a breach of contract, the general rule is that the promisee may en-
force the undertaking of the obligor only to the extent of the damage proved
to have been incurred by reason of the promisor's breachr 6 However, the
promisee may be able to collect the full amount of the bond as liquidated
damages for the breach if the designated sum is found to be a reasonable pre-
diction of the injury which would be caused by a failure of performance,57
and if, at the time of contracting, it had appeared that the actual damage flow-
ing from a breach would be difficult to ascertain.58
Like the penal bond, the letter of credit designed to compensate a beneficiary
for a contractual breach imposes a duty upon a third party to pay a fixed sum
to a promisee in the event of a failure of performance. Yet, the beneficiary
of such a letter of credit enjoys an important advantage over the obligee of
a penal bond: the obligee to collect must sustain the burden of proving at trial
a breach of contract and the resulting injury, while the beneficiary may obtain
any amount up to the designated sum merely by alleging to the bank a failure
of performance and the extent of his damage.5 9 Thus, the judicial scrutiny
which accompanies the modern penal bond is not found in the letter of credit
mechanism. But a court might be asked to intervene if a bank, acting in its
own interest or at the request of the customer, refused payment to the bene-
ficiary on the ground that the letter of credit awarded a promisee an unen-
54. 5 CORBIN, CO RACTS § 1056 (1951).
55. Ibid.
56. National Cooperative Refinery Ass'n v. Northern Ordnance, 238 F.2d 803, 807 (10th
Cir. 1956); LUNT, SURETY BONDS 196-197 (1922). Similarly, if funds are deposited in
escrow to assure performance of a contract, the party injured may collect only the actual
amount of his damage, see REsTATEmENT, CONTRACrS § 340 (1932) ; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 1074 (1951) ; 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS § 790 (rev. ed. 1936), unless the sum constitutes
a valid provision for liquidated damages, see notes 57, 58 infra and accompanying text.
57. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 339(1) (a) (1932); 3 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 783
(rev. ed. 1936).
58. Ely v. Wickham, 158 F.2d 233, 234 (10th Cir. 1946) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 339(1) (b) (1932); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 783 (rev. ed. .1936). The obligor may
not be held liable for a greater sum than the amount of the bond plus interest. Bill Curphy
Co. v. Elliott, 207 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1953) ; see REsTATEmExT, CONTRACTS § 339(2) (1932);
5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1056 (1951).
59. Thus, while the contention that the letter of credit is not ultra vires as a
guaranty may be sustained by emphasizing the independent and automatic obligation of
the bank to pay, see note 40 supra, this same feature of the letter of credit may lead to
its invalidation as a penalty.
1957]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
forceable penalty for a breach of contract.60 The question of a penalty might
also be raised if the customer sought to enjoin payment by the bank.61 More-
over, the customer might sue the beneficiary to recover sums which the bank
had paid, alleging that no breach had occurred or, if there were a breach, that
the amount collected from the bank far exceeded actual damage.
The traditional judicial hostility to penalties in the law of contract would
seem to constitute a potential infringement upon the protection enjoyed by a
beneficiary, when a letter of credit is established as a source of compensation
for unsatisfactory performance. If a bank refused to pay the beneficiary, assert-
ing that the instrument authorized a penalty, a court would undoubtedly be
indifferent to the fact that the promisor had voluntarily provided the irrevocable
letter of credit as security for his own performance.6 2 The proscription against
penalties has long been recognized as a deviation from the principle of free-
dom of contract, founded upon overriding considerations of public policy.63
60. Although, in this context, the letter of credit resembles a penal bond, its validity
is less likely to be tested. Eager to retain its credit standing, a bank might be unwilling
to raise the penalty issue as a basis for refusing payment after conforming documents
have been tendered. However, if the bank were more concerned with the good will of
its customer or elected to avoid a loss that would result were the customer unable to
reimburse, see note 49 supra, the penalty question might be raised to block payment. See
Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 807, 836 (1956). And while such a blocking of payment is con-
trary to the entire letter of credit concept, a court might well allow it as a defense because
of the strong public policy against penalties and devices contrived to provide for them.
See note 63 infra and accompanying text. To buttress its contentions, the bank could
point to cases holding the prohibition against penalties applicable to funds deposited with
an escrow agent, see note 56 supra. Cf. Bogert, Trusts and Escrows in Credit Conveyanwing,
21 ILL. L. Rmv. 655, 672-75 (1927).
61. In the traditional buyer-seller context, such requests for injunctive relief have by
and large been unsuccessful. See note 16 supra. There is case law, however, to the effect
that evidence of fraud will sustain an injunction against the issuing bank even though the
documents tendered conform to the terms of the credit. See Bank of Montreal v. Recknagel,
109 N.Y. 482, 17 N.E. 217 (188) ; Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177
Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Grob v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 177 Misc.
45, 29 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (dictum). Compare American Steel Co. v. Irving
Nat'l Bank, 266 Fed. 41 (2d Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 617 (1922) (issuing bank
must honor drafts although performance of sales contract might be illegal), with Nadler
v. Mei Loong Corp. of China, Ltd., 177 Misc. 263, 30 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (show-
ing of hardship warrants injunction against payment). Arguing that commercial policy
requires the prevention of burdensome penalties as well as the policing of fraud, a customer
could conceivably obtain an injunction to litigate the penalty issue.
62. Almost any anticipatory provision for a penalty is regarded with disfavor. Cf. 66
HARv. L. REV. 525 (1953).
In any event, the terminology employed by the parties-"liquidated damages" or "penalty"
-will be of little significance to the court. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205
U.S. 105 (1907); Nacional Financiera, S.A. v. Banco de Ponce, 275 App. Div. 827, 89
N.Y.S.2d 480 (1st Dep't 1949). But see Bauer v. Sawyer, 8 Ill. 2d 351, 134 N.E.2d 329
(1956) (use of word "forfeit" persuasive).
63. 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 1057 (1951).
On the other hand, courts will recognize as valid a provision in a contract limiting
the liability of the parties in the event of default. R-s5TATEMENT, CONRACrS §§ 339,
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Moreover, the penalty aspect of the letter of credit mechanism is magnified by
the fact that the promisee is relieved of proving not only the extent of his damage
but also that the contract was actually breached. 6 4
Assuming that this unilateral determination of breach would not make the
instrument fatally defective as a penalty, the beneficiary who is refused pay-
ment might be able to convince the court that the amount specified in the letter
of credit represents a valid provision for liquidated damages. 65 However, in
the case of the letter of credit opened for the Greek buyer,"6 the loss which
would be caused by the seller's breach would appear to be easy to calculate;
hence one of the prerequisites for enforcing a provision fixing damages in
advance would be absent. In the case of the letters of credit authorized by
the American harbor builder 67 and the Japanese shipyard,68 one kind of
breach which the parties contemplate is the possibility that performance will
not be completed by the specified date. Courts have upheld, as a valid provision
for liquidated damages, an agreement binding a contractor to pay a fixed sum
for each day's tardiness in concluding performance.6 9 In contrast to such
an arrangement, the letter of credit mechanism permits the beneficiary to col-
lect the full amount of the instrument, regardless of the extent to which per-
formance is in fact delayed.70 Thus a court may find a penalty element present,
since the promisee is enabled to obtain a sum grossly disproportionate to the
actual harm which a limited delay in performance may be expected to cause.7'
In addition to tardiness, the letter of credit secures the beneficiary against
574-75 (1932); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1068 (1951); 3 WILLISrON, CONTRACTS § 781A
(rev. ed. 1936) ; Brightman, Liquidated Damages, 25 COLUm. L. RF v. 277 (1925).
64. The party who would collect under a standard liquidated damage clause is obliged
to prove breach but not the extent of the injury. 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1062 (1951).
See Union Paving Co. v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 179 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
65. See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1061 (1951); 3 WILLISTON, CONT.crs § 783 (rev.
ed. 1936) ; Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 226 (1930) ; Steffen v. United States,
213 F.2d 266, 270 (6th Cir. 1954).
66. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text. Because the beneficiary in this
case would be a sovereign power it is possible that the letter of credit would be accorded
the more protected status afforded penal bonds posted to secure public construction.
Steffen v. United States, 213 F2d 266 (6th Cir. 1954); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1055
(1951) ; cf. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153 (1956). But cf. Priebe
& Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947) (sovereign has no implied authority
to impose penalty).
68. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
69. Broderick Wood Products Co. v. United States, 195 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1952) ;
United States v. American Employers Ins. Co., 141 F. Supp. 281, 291 (E.D. Pa. 1956) ;
5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1072 (1951) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 785 (rev. ed. 1936).
70. I&ERvinws. In practice, however, beneficiaries of this kind of letter of credit
have, in the event of a breach, collected only that amount which they believe to be a fair
estimate of the actual damage suffered. Ibid. This result is of course not inherent in the
terms of the letter of credit, but is attributable solely to the good faith of the beneficiary.
71. Marshall v. Patzman, 306 P.2d 287 (Ariz. 1957) ; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1063
(1951); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 779 (rev. ed. 1936).
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a breach of warranty arising from a defective job of construction, and against
the failure of the contractor to make any performance at all. An agreement
fixing liquidated damages for either of these breaches might be invalidated on
the ground that the actual injury which would be incurred by the promisee is
readily susceptible of determination. 7 - Moreover, the whole letter of credit
mechanism could be attacked as a penalty for the reason that it permits an
identical amount to be made payable, irrespective of the nature of the breach
or the actual extent of the injury.73
Thus, when a contracting party authorizes a letter of credit as protection
against faulty performance, the beneficiary is subject to the risk that, despite
the express terms of the instrument, payment cannot be enforced against the
bank upon a mere allegation of breach and the amount of damage. While the
beneficiary would still enjoy the security of the bank's credit, he would lose
the advantage of escaping burdens of proof and, like any other promisee, would
have to establish at trial that he was entitled to a specific amount from the
bank as compensation for a contractual breach.
When the letter of credit serves as an alternative means of payment, the
penalty and liquidated damage questions are not as relevant. Payment under
the letter of credit would seem to constitute a performance discharging the
buyer's contractual obligation rather than the collection of damages for unsatis-
factory performance. 74 Such an arrangement is no more of a penalty than if
a buyer deposited in escrow the purchase price of goods, to be collected upon
the seller's delivery of the merchandise. However, a claim of penalty might
be raised if the amount which the seller was entitled to collect under the letter
of credit exceeded the sum owed if payment were made by the primary means. 73
72. Hugo V. Loewi, Inc. v. Geschwill, 186 F.2d 849, 857-58 (9th Cir. 1951); A-Z
Servicenter, Inc. v. Segall, 138 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Mass. 1956).
When a party has a contractual obligation to deliver readily obtainable goods, court!
have invalidated a provision for liquidated damages on the ground that the injury which
a breach would cause the buyer could be easily calculated by deducting the contract price
from the market price. 5 CoRBIN, CO TRACTS § 1064 (1951). Similarly, it may be con-
tended that if the contractor does not perform at all, the loss caused to the promisee would
be the difference between the price charged by the contractor and the price to be paid a sub-
stitute contractor. However, to the extent that a substitute contractor is not readily
obtainable and the subsequent delay in completing performance causes lost profits, th
situations are not completely analogous; accordingly, a liquidated damage provision covering
a contractor's total failure of performance might be sustained. Cf. note 69 supra and ac-
companying text.
73. See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1066 (1951).
74. While a provision for an alternate means of payment could not be considered
as a waiver of any legal remedies on the contract, performance of such alternative earns
the party a complete discharge. Satisfaction of a clause for liquidated damages, on the
other hand, is not one of two performances a party may elect but one of two remedies
available to the party who has performed. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1070 (1951); 3
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 781 (rev. ed. 1936).
75. 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTs § 1065 (1951). Only the legal rate of interest may be in-
cluded if the higher sum payable on default is not to be deemed a penalty. Courts are wary
of the argument that the higher amount payable is the price bargained for by the parties
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Similarly, in the case of the letter of credit opened for the CCC,76 a penalty
element might be present if the amount of the instrument was greater than the
fair market value of the strategic materials which the grain exporter was
obligated to deliver. When a letter of credit is a source of compensation for a
surety,77 the device is not susceptible to attack as a penalty, since the surety
is enabled to collect only the amount which the customer owes him as reim-
bursement for payment under the bond.
CONCLUSION
As a method of insuring compensation for a breach of a contractual duty, the
commercial letter of credit differs markedly from other security devices tra-
ditionally employed by contracting parties: the promisee is entitled to payment
merely upon alleging that the promisor has not rendered the bargained-for
performance. Thus, the instrument will be utilized to secure the fulfillment of
a contractual obligation only when the promisor has complete confidence in
the good faith of his promisee. The very fact that the beneficiary of the "new"
letter of credit enjoys such unrestricted powers of collection accents trouble-
some penalty questions. It would seem that the parties can mitigate the danger
that the mechanism will be deemed penal by providing a maximum amount of
recovery for each of the various possible kinds of contractual breaches. Thus,
if the alleged breach were one day's delay in completion of performance, the
beneficiary would not be given the freedom to collect the same sum which he
might recover in the event of a year's delay in completing performance or a
total failure of performance. If the maximum amounts specified were reason-
able estimates of the harm flowing from the particular breach, and if the actual
injury which would be caused by the breach appeared difficult to ascertain,
the letter of credit device would come much closer to resembling a valid liqui-
dated damages provision. In addition, there is some chance that these variations
will be labeled an ultra vires guaranty. Although courts should not hesitate
to vitiate letters of credit which are disguised penalties, they should be reluc-
tant to brand other transactions ultra vires. The growth of the letter of credit
has been due in large measure to the willingness of courts to align case law
with progressive commercial practice. Accordingly, conceptual difficulties in-
volving the power of a bank to issue a "new" letter of credit should yield to
the dictates of modem business needs.
and the lower amount represents a discount for prompt payment. To determine whether
the higher amount is in fact a penalty notwithstanding this contention, the courts will
consider the fair market value of the goods sold. Ibid.
76. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
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